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Abstract
Participation in crop insurance programs is lowered by imperfect knowledge result-
ing in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. We aim at investigating how
experience in insurance contracts may influence participation in the Italian crop
insurance market. From Italian farm-level data we estimate a dynamic discrete
choice model of participation to investigate the role of experience. The method-
ology, coupled with exploratory analysis of the data, allows one to compare the
relevance of different sources of experience in the crop insurance decision making
process. We found that experience tend to be a catalyst for insurance participa-
tion. Policy implications are discussed: in particular we discuss on the importance
of bolstering uptake to exploit the advantages of the inertia and spillover effects
that emerge from experience. To the best of our knowledge, the role of experience
has been underinvestigated. Our analysis has the specific contribution of modeling
the potential role of experience (exploited after buying an insurance contract) on
uptake in crop insurance programs.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, Dynamic model, Familiarity, Imperfect
Knowledge, Uptake.
JEL: G22, Q12, Q18
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Imperfect Information and Participation in Insurance
Markets: Evidence from Italy
Risk management in agriculture is receiving growing attention in develop-
ing and develoed countries, as attested by the increase in prominence of crop
insurance programs, where participation has been enhanced through subsi-
dies (Mahul and Stutley, 2010). While the world’s largest risk management
program - the United States of America’s one - supports farmers through
hedge funds, revenue insurance programs, mutual funds, and weather in-
dexes, in the European Union, the tools are still not much diffused. The EU
regulation 1305/2013 promotes the use of subsidized crop insurance contracts
(art. 37), of mutual funds (art. 38) and of the Income Stabilization Tool
(art. 39), and leaves to Member States the flexibility to adopt autonomous
national policies that fall into one of the mentioned set of tools (Meuwis-
sen et al., 2013; Cordier, 2014; Liesivaara and Myyra, 2014; Santeramo and
Ramsey, 2017).
Italy has a long tradition of farm subsidies, but has had difficulty in
achieving crop insurance participation. Participation in Italian crop insur-
ance programs is generally low: around 15% of farmers participate in crop
insurance programs. High costs of bureaucracy, ineffectiveness of Defense
Consortia, and lack of experience with crop insurance contracts are some of
the factors that have contributed to keep uptake low and farmers reluctant
to participate in crop insurance programs.
Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) argue that imperfect knowledge and
asymmetric information are likely to play a substantial role in the insur-
ance decision-making process, and are potential drivers of low participation
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(Chiappori and Salanie, 2013). Analyzing the automobile insurance market,
Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997, p.75) concluded on the role of imperfect
knowledge and experience: ”learning can be expected to modify this situa-
tion and, [...] driver’s experience allows her to learn about her true ability
faster than the insurance company.”
Several papers have analyzed the determinants of participation in crop
insurance programs (e.g. Santeramo et al. 2016, Seo et al., 2017), and the
factors affecting the demand for agricultural insurance have been extensively
studied, and the literature allows to draw conclusions on the role of assets
(e.g. Goodwin, 1993; Enjolras and Sentis, 2011; Singerman, Hart and Lence,
2012; ), human capital (Smith and Bacquet, 1996 ), and farmers’ strate-
gies (Foudi and Erdlenbruch, 2012) on insurance decisions. However, little
evidence has been provided to establish the role of experience in the crop
insurance decision making process. Indeed, learning by doing and learning
from others may stimulate technology adoption ( Conley and Udry, 2010),
and reduce the asymmetric information (Chiappori and Salanie, 2013). San-
teramo et al. (2016) analyzed what drives a farmer to enter and exit the
Italian crop insurance market.
However, the existing research, with very few exceptions (Cole et al.,
2014; Ye et al., 2017), has dedicated relatively lower attention to the role
of experience on participation in crop insurance programs, especially in the
EU. Put differently, the role of experience on uptake in crop insurance pro-
grams is not much discussed, and has not been quantified. Indeed, as follows
from Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) and Chiappori and Salanie (2013),
experience is likely to be important. Little evidence has been provided on
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the role of experience in the crop insurance decision making process. Indeed,
learning by doing and learning by watching others are mechanisms that may
stimulate technology adoption in agriculture ( Conley and Udry, 2010), and
they are likely to help reducing the imperfect and asymmetric information
that characterize insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2013).
Understanding the determinants of uptake is an important goal for Eu-
ropean Union (EU) policymakers, and exploring the role of experience (and
information) is a promising area of research. Several empirical inquiries de-
serve investigation: Does imperfect information discourage participation in
crop insurance markets? What is the influence of experience on partici-
pation? We investigate if and how experience (i.e. buying crop insurance
contracts) may help enhancing uptake.
The analysis is devoted to assess the role of experience through a dynamic
model of participation and a detailed 7-years firm-level panel of Italian farms.
We show that experience in crop insurance is positively related with uptake.
The rationale is that the experience acquired in past harvest seasons is likely
to reduce the imperfect knowledge on both sides, and thus enhance uptake.
Our conclusions pose emphasis on suggestions for a better implementation
of policy interventions at EU and national levels.
The Italian crop insurance system
Public intervention started in 1970, with the so called Fondo di Solidarieta
Nazionale (FSN), intended to compensate farmers who had been affected by
natural disasters. The FSN has evolved over time, but, until early 2000s, the
interventions have been mainly in form of ex-post compensations.
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Starting in 2000, the Consorzi di Difesa were introduced in order to facil-
itate the match of supply and demand in the subsidized crop insurance mar-
ket, and to facilitate the transition from mono-risk to pluri-risks contracts.
In 2004, the Legislative Decree No. 102/2004 modified the intervention from
ex post compensations to ex ante subsidies, introduced pluri-risks and multi-
risks contracts (that three or all adversities) and ended the subsidies to mono-
risk (i.e. single-peril) contracts. Starting from 2014 the insurance policy must
cover at least three climatic adversities eligible for pluririsks policies. The
pluririsks policies ensure farmers against losses due to three or more climatic
adversities, which need not be mutually exclusive. The multi-risks policies
ensure against losses due to any type of climatic adversity included in the
Annual Insurance Plan (Piano Assicurativo Annuale). Currently, the Italian
crop insurance policies are subsidized through EU funds: subsidies were as
high as 80% of the insurance premium for policies against damages (reaching
at least 30% of assured production) caused by adverse weather conditions
and other natural disasters, and it is up to 50% of the cost of the premium
if the insurance contract also covers other losses caused by adverse weather
conditions that are not considered to be widespread natural disasters, or
losses caused by animal or plant diseases. Since 2010, due to the EU Reg.
73/2009, the subsidies have been decreased to 65%. In 2015 a new set of
contracts has been offered an replace the previous system: types A, B and
C offer coverage against different combinations of infrequent perils, frequent
perils, and additional adversities. The indemnities paid for mono- and pluri-
risks policies are computed through qualitative and quantitative assessments
of the percentage of losses due to the insured adversities; the multi-risk pol-
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icy, also known as yield insurance, compensates farmers for losses when the
realized yield is below the average historical yield by a certain threshold1.
The market structure consists of one public-private coinsurance pool,
twenty-five private insurance companies, and several mutual/cooperative en-
tities participating in the agricultural insurance system (Mahul and Stutley,
2010). While (private) insurance companies may set their own premium
rates, the companies coordinate pricing policies and the maximum levels of
insurance premiums eligible for a subsidy, with the Ministry of Agriculture,
”competition is predominantly based on quality of insurance services” (Mahul
and Stutley, 2010, Annex E p.118).
The individual demand for crop insurance contracts is aggregated through
Defense Consortia, a local institution aimed at enhancing insurance uptake
by matching insurers’ supply and farmers’ demand. Farmers are offered
contracts from different insurance companies, and select the contract with the
highest perceived quality. The existence of Defense Consortia is symptomatic
of a clear asymmetric information that separate insurers and farmers.
During the decade 2000-2010 the total coverage (crops, livestock and
farm’s capital) has increased slowly but steadily from 1 million to 1.1 million
hectares, out of 13 millions of total insurable land, the number of insured
farmers has remained low, but the number of contracts and the insured value
grew by more than 40 % from 2004 to 2010: such a increase is mainly due to
the spread of multi-risks contracts to cover almost every single crop of the
insured farms.
Contracts that cover losses from multiple risks have increased in promi-
1Usually the threshold is 30%, but there are contracts with lower thresholds, such as
10%, 15% or 20%.
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nence. Between 2003 and 2009, the share of single-peril insurance contracts
against hail has halved while the share of multiple risk contracts has in-
creased.
See table 1
Currently, the vast majority of contracts are purchased by farms located
in Northern Italy: in 2010 the North accounted for 78% of the insured value,
the Centre for 8% and the South for the remaining 14%. The number of
insured crops has increased from 58 (in 2002) to 164 (in 2010), although four
crops account for half of the total insured value: wine grapes, apple, rice,
and corn.
Participation level and imperfect knowledge
In order to increase uptake, crop insurance programs are usually incentivized:
premia are subsidized and the set of subsidized policies is generally widened.
A drawback of leveraging crop insurance demand with subsidies is due to
the increasing marginal costs that derive from the inclusion of farmers that
have low propensity of being insured. According to Glauber (2013), in US an
increase in subsidies from 2.73 (in 1981-1994) to 7.76 (in 1999-2003) boosted
marginal costs from 3.31 to 25.99, making the policy costly and, in the long-
run, unfeasible. The implications of crop insurance subsidies go far beyond
an increase in participation. The subsidies tend to increase regional differ-
ences in terms of subsidies received, may hide ex-ante and ex-post oppor-
tunistic behavior (i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard), and may favor
rent seeking strategies. Furthermore, subsidies may promote a crowding out
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effect of alternative risk management strategies (Goodwin, 2001; Du et al.,
2015), distorting the demand for risk management strategies. Thus, how to
design crop insurance policies with (relatively low) unintended consequences
is a legitimate and important question. The present analysis focuses on the
impacts generated by imperfect knowledge.
Imperfect and asymmetric information (i.e. lack of information on farmer
and/or insuree side), through adverse selection (i.e. self-selection of riskier
farmers to enter the insurance market) and moral hazard (i.e. riskier be-
havior adopted by insured farmers), are the main factors that help explain
low participation in insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2013). On
one side riskier insurees have private knowledge on the risks they face and
they find profitable to insure at the rate that insurers set for average-risky
customers. Such adverse selection mechanism pushes insurers to compensate
their financial exposure by setting higher rates (Goodwin and Smith, 2013;
Glauber, 2013)2. On the other side, insurers have private knowledge on the
type of contract they offer3, at the detriment of clarity and transparency of
contracts to farmers (Chiappori and Salanie 2000, 2013). A third channel
2We acknowledge comments from a reviewer. We specify why adverse selection (and
imperfect information on both sides) tend to lower participation. We distinguish two chains
of behaviors when imperfect information is on both sides. First case: premia are set by
insurers on lower risk profiles (i.e. insurers tend to underestimate risks and therefore the
premium rates); premia are lower; only the (above the threshold) farmers tend to insure.
In this case, the imperfect information on farmers side discourages participation. Second
case: premia are set by insurers on higher risk profiles (i.e. insurers tend to overestimate
risks and therefore the premium rates), participation is discouraged normal-risk farmers,
and for high-risk farmers (regardless of strategic behaviors of farmers). In this case, the
imperfect information on insurers side and the imperfect information on farmers side
discourage participation.
3An alternative way to look at this problem is that insurance contract tend to be
overcomplicated by commas, clauses and footnotes that are not transparent when the
contract is accepted, or are not fully taken into consideration by the insuree.
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through which imperfect knowledge disfavors participation consists of high
transaction costs implied by heavy bureaucracy - the cumbersome process to
obtain subsidies for the premium, to claim reimbursements for yield losses,
and the delays in payments for subsidies and claimed losses. This channel
disfavors participation of farmers who are vulnerable to liquidity constraints.
In all these cases the imperfect knowledge is likely to be resolved (at least
partially), under the insurance contract, at the end of the harvest season. In
other terms, a farmer who has stipulated an insurance contract will reveal
(at the end of the season, through his decisions and production strategies)
some of their private knowledge in terms of riskiness. On the other hand, the
insurer will also reveal to the insured farmer (at the end of the season, by hon-
oring the contract) some of their own private knowledge on the goodness of
the contract. Finally, both the insurer and the farmer will gain experience on
the bureaucracy of insurance at the end of each season. All in all, it is likely
that the more contracts are stipulated, the higher the experience on both
sides, the lower the frictions due to imperfect knowledge. A similar mech-
anism has been hypothesized and tested in automobile (Cohen, 2005) and
health care markets (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), which share with the
crop insurance markets the characteristics of dealing with slowly depletable
goods. The quality-based competition of Italian crop insurance companies
is likely to produce a similar type of asymmetric information. Crop insurers
put large effort on advertising their insurance policies and provide complex
contracts. Despite this, farmers encounter difficulties when stipulating insur-
ance contracts and look for the assistance of defense consortia, both catalyst
of the demand for insurance and impartial guarantors of the goodness of the
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contract.
Empirical setting
We use a reduced form expression of the probability for farmer to stipulate
an insurance contract (regardless of the type of insurance contract, that is
regardless of buying a single-peril or a multi-peril contract) as function of
risk attitudes, familiarity and other determinants that we collect under the
category of control factors. The theoretical basis is in line with numerous
studies on demand for crop insurance (Goodwin, 1993; Enjolras and Sentis,
2011; Santeramo et al., 2016). The probability depends on risk attitudes
(µi), familiarity (Ωi,t), and other (control) factors (Zt):
(1) Prob(Insuranceit = 1|µi,Ωi,t, Zi,t) = f(µi, Expi,t, Zt)
We assume that the familiarity with an insurance scheme may play a
role in the decision-making process. Experience is gained after buying an
insurance contract, regardless of the payment of an indemnity. A farmer
who is better informed on the functioning of insurance contracts may be
more or less willing to adopt crop insurance, depending on how well the
insurance program works, and on how much are the net benefit (or loss) for
participating farmers (Gin et al., 2008; Akter et al., 2009; Sibiko and Qaim,
2017). Hence, a priori we cannot conclude on the role of familiarity with the
program.4 Familiarity (Ωi,t = {Experiencei,t}) is gained through experience:
4We gratefully acknowledge the comments of the reviews on two aspects of our model.
First, the model is free of assumptions on aversion or propensity toward risks. Second,
our model is not able to disentangle the effects of the experience of the insurer and of the
experience of the insuree in that they both work in the same direction (i.e. solving the
imperfect information).
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a farmer (i) gains experience by participating in the program.
A number of control factors have been adopted for two specific reasons:
first, the dataset we used contains a limited number of variables; second, we
adopted variables that have been adopted and have been found relevant in
previous studies on crop insurance participation in Europe (cfr. Enjoras and
Sentis, 2011; Di Falco et al., 2015; Santeramo et al., 2016).
Experience
Farmers take advantage of gained experience to make their decision on in-
surance. Experience is gained by insuring and thus collecting information on
how the program works. We assume experience can be purely transitory (if
the knowledge accumulation process has very short memory), or permanent
(if the knowledge accumulation process has infinite memory)5.
If experience is purely transitory, farmers only benefit from the infor-
mation gained in the previous year, and the variable transitory experience
reduces to the lagged dependent variable:
Experiencei,t = Insurancei,t−1
On the contrary, if experience is permanent, the information gained through
insurance lasts forever, therefore the timing of insurance is not relevant once
farmers have purchased insurance. The variable permanent experience re-
duces to an indicator function equal to one if the lagged dependent variable
has been one at least once in previous periods:
5By modeling the variable with polar cases we are able to conclude on the role of
experience. We also use a continuous variable to assess the role of cumulated experience
and found no differences.
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Experiencei,t =
1 if
∑T−l
l=1 Insurancei,t−l > 0
0 otherwise.
with T standing for the total number of years.
Econometric specification
Our data comprise six years, up to 2010, of thousands of farms representative
of the entire national population of Italian farms. More specifically, the farms
included in the dataset (a subsample of the FADN dataset) are selected on
the basis of a survey plan, conducted by each EU Member State of the EU
in order to guarantee the representativeness. In particular, the dataset is
constructed after stratification of the universe of farms, according to the
type of farms (e.g. type of crops, livestocks, etc. ), and the geographical
distribution. The (strongly balanced) panel data allows one to estimate the
dynamics of the decision-making process in the insurance program.
A linear approximation of equation for participation in crop insurance
contracts can be easily estimated:
(2) Prob(Insuranceit = 1|µi,Ωi,t, Zi,t) = Φ(γExperiencei,t + Z ′i,tβ + µi)
Given that the probability of being insured (Prob(Insuranceit = 1|Ψi,Ωi,t, Zi,t))
is not observed, and experience is gained through participation (e.g. Experiencei,t =
Insurancei,t−1), the model is estimated as a dynamic probit model.
It is worth noting that even if the error terms of the probit model are
assumed serially independent, there exists serial correlation induced by the
12
time-invariant term (µi)
6. Since the dependent variable (Iit) is a binary
variable (the decision to insure or not), we normalize it by imposing a unitary
value for the variance of the error term (σ2u = 1).
The model requires an assumption on the relationships between the ini-
tial observation (Insurancei,1) and the unobserved heterogeneity (µi). The
simplest solution is to assume the initial observation exogenous, but this is a
strong assumption for the vast majority of datasets, whose start period does
not coincide with the start of the process7. If the initial observation is corre-
lated with the unobserved heterogeneity, the standard Random Effects (RE)
probit estimator is inconsistent and overestimates γ (i.e. the state depen-
dence is overestimated). Following Heckman (1981), we use a reduced form
equation for the initial observation (Insurancei,1) with instruments (Xi,1)
which includes the set of explanatory variables (Experience−i,1, Zi,1) for the
main model and exogenous instruments (xi,1). The instruments are assumed
to be correlated with the random effects and uncorrelated with the error
term.
We evaluate the estimates by computing the average partial effects (APE)
of state dependence (Insurancei,t−1). We multiply the coefficient γˆµ by a
weighted sample average of the distribution:
6This specification implies equi-correlation between vi,t = µi +ui,t in any two different
periods: λ = Corr(vi,t, vi,s) =
σ2µ
σ2µ+σ
2
u
. We may also estimate a more general model
by relaxing the assumption of no autocorrelation of the error term. The model requires
T-dimensional integrals of normal densities but, although feasible, it requires a great
computation effort (Stewart, 2005). The estimates of the state dependence coefficient are
generally slightly lower, therefore the model we estimate represents an upper bound, a
conservative measure to not overestimate the effects of experience.
7If the assumption is correct, the model can be estimated as a standard Random Effects
(RE) Probit Model.
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N−1
∑N
i=1 Φ(γˆµIi,t−1 + δˆµExperience−i,t + Z
′
i,tβˆµ)γˆµ
where the subscript µ indicates that the parameter need to multiplied
by (1 + σ2µ)
−1/2, and in particular γˆµ = γ(1 + σ2µ)
−1/2, δˆµ = δ(1 + σ2µ)
−1/2,
βˆµ = β(1 + σ
2
µ)
−1/2, and the coefficients γ, δ and β are the MLE estimates.
Empirical results
Data
Our analysis is based on a dataset drawn from the Farm Accountancy Data
Network, a database representative of European commercial agriculture. The
dataset employed in the present analysis consists of a strongly balanced panel
data of 18,382 observations: 2,626 Italian firms, continuously observed from
2004 to 2010, whose main activity is farming, located in nineteen different
Italian Regions. We collected information on the entire sample available from
the FADN, that is constructed to be representative of the entire population
of Italian farms.
The uptake for crop insurance is heterogeneous across space, in general,
is rather low. The dataset shows that a large number of farmers do not
buy insurance contracts, and only a small fraction of insured farmers buy
insurance contracts for consecutive years (table 2). Notably, a small share of
farmers (almost five percent) has been insured for four (or more) consecutive
years during the period 2004-2007. It is also remarkable the drop in coverage
occurred in 2008, when new insurance contracts, such as insurance contracts
with no threshold or against plant diseases, started to be offered. The data
reveal that the demand for insurance felt by 5% in 2009 (with respect to
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the period average), and increased up to 9% in 2010. Te same trend can
be observed in the Italian crop insurance market: in 2009 the number of
Insurance contracts dropped by 2.5% with respect to 2007, with a recovery
of the market from 2010 (in fact we observe a positive trend of total insured
value).
See table 2
Our dataset provides yearly information on land size (i.e. the number of
cultivated hectares), altitude (a dummy equal to one if the farm is located
600 meters above sea level), farmers’ age (expressed in years), diversifica-
tion of farming activities (a dummy equal to one if the number of cultivated
crops in one year is larger than one), adoption of irrigation (a dummy equal
to one if the farm is partially or entirely irrigated). The variable ”Revenue
Variability” is obtained as standard deviation of farms’ revenue (over the
entire period, 2004-2010), and expected premium per hectare8. We do not
observe farm-level premium rates. We compute the variable ”Expected Pre-
mia” by averaging, across Regions and farming systems, the crop-specific
total premia. The aggregate premium is a proxy of the premium farmers are
expected to pay, and a proxy for the level of riskiness for all farms of a given
type and located in a specific region. The approach is similar to that adopted
by Goodwin (1993) and Santeramo et al. (2016). Descriptive statistics of
control factors are shown in tables 3.
See table 3
8Computed by averaging within regions and farming systems the (crop-specific) total
premia
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The average farm size in Italy is rather small. For instance, the average
size of farms in Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Lombardia and Piemonte, home
well known agro-food products, is only eighteen hectares, compared to an
average size of US farms that is twenty five times larger (500 hectares). A
vast majority of farms are not insured, and not irrigated with percentage at
regional level that do not exceed, respectively, 23 and 43 percent (excluded
Liguria).
Experience
As preliminary analysis we investigate whether data support the presence
of asymmetric information (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000): we found that
the (average) variability of production for insured farmers exceeds the (av-
erage) variability of production for uninsured farmers. The analysis does
not allow us to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard, but is valid
to conclude that insured farmers have larger variability in production and
therefore asymmetric information is likely to exist (Einav, Finkelstein and
Levin, 2010).
The estimates using a pooled probit model, a standard random effects
probit model and a random effects model a-la-Heckman confirm that the ef-
fects of experience are overestimated if simple estimators are adopted (table
4). While the signs of control factors are unaltered over the three estima-
tors, the coefficients for experience are much larger if a pooled or a standard
random effects probit model is adopted. The pooled probit estimates ignore
the cross-correlation between the individual composite errors in different pe-
riods. When we control for the endogeneity of initial conditions (Heckman,
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1981; Stewart, 2005), the effect is largely reduced. We estimate all remaining
models with the Heckman model.
See table 4
We compute average partial effects (APE) for experience. A consistent
estimator for the APE is the change in the probability distribution (PDF)
function evaluated at the sample mean, after normalization of the maximum
likelihood (MLE) coefficients. Empirically, we multiply the MLE parameters
by (1+σˆ2µ)
−1/2, and evaluate the PDF under different values for ”Experience”
at the sample mean9.
The measures for experience are positive and statistically significant. As
we should expect, farmers who have experienced crop insurance contracts are
much more likely to purchase insurance with respect to farmers who have
never experienced insurance contracts, even if located in Regions where crop
insurance programs are popular. Farmers with experience in crop insurance
are 10% more likely to buy insurance with respect to a previously uninsured
farmer.
Transitory experience is stronger than permanent experience: the likeli-
hood of purchasing insurance is as high as 10% if farmers have experienced
insurance during the previous season, and only 3.5% if they had experience
in earlier seasons
See table 5
Other factors influence participation in crop insurance markets. We found
that large and irrigated farms are more likely to be insured, while farms
9Knowing that λ =
σ2µ
σ2µ+σ
2
u
and σ2u = 1, we compute σˆ
2
µ =
λ
1−λ .
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located at high altitude are less likely to be insured. The results are consistent
with the existing literature on crop insurance (Goodwin, 1993; Enjolras and
Sentis, 2011; Foudi and Erdlenbruch, 2012; Singerman, Hart and Lence,
2012)10. In addition we observe a positive correlation between participation
in insurance schemes with the variables ”revenue variability” and ”expected
premium”: the higher the revenue variability, the higher the likelihood of
stipulating an insurance contract; the higher is the expected premium, which
reflects a higher level of underlying risk, the higher is the participation in
crop insurance program. This seemingly counterintuitive result is explained
by the crop data scarcity which imposes higher premiums in Italy (Shen et
al., 2016). In order to disentagle the effects of premiums we would need to
rely on expert knowledge of the degree of riskiness: unfortunately, those data
are not available.
Conclusions
Risk management tools have a long history in the EU. Despite this, and
the strong emphasis that the current Common Agricultural Policy has posed
on risk management tools (namely subsidized crop insurance, Mutual Funds
and Income Stabilization Tool), the participation in crop insurance programs
in the EU has been low for decades. Several frictions are likely to lower
uptake. We use a detailed farm-level dataset to investigate a determinant
that has received relatively little attention. In particular, we investigate how
experience, through learning-by-doing and learning-from-others mechanisms,
10Although not statistically significant, we found a negative relationships between farm-
ers’ age and crop diversification with participation in crop insurance programs. The results
are consistent with Foudi and Erdlenbruch (2012), among others.
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influence the crop insurance decision making process.
We conclude that experience in crop insurance tends to increase partic-
ipation: in other terms, we found that farmers who have experienced crop
insurance tend to insure in the subsequent years. The mechanisms we pos-
tulate is that the experience acquired during the previous harvest season is
likely to reduce the imperfect knowledge and acts as catalyst for participa-
tion.
To the extent that increasing participation is an important goal for policy-
makers and insurance companies, reducing the imperfect knowledge through
ad hoc measures (e.g. information campaigns, thematic workshops, may
prove an effective strategy that should be encouraged at the EU, national
and local levels.
We conclude with few sentences on possible limitations of the present
study. First, the external validity of our results is limited by the lack of in-
formation about the type of contracts stipulated. However, even if such data
were available, the main results should not change: the asymmetric informa-
tion between farmers and insurers is partially resolved through experience,
and this in turn stimulates insurance coverage renewals. Second, the present
study does not take into account potential spill-over effects that may be in-
duced by the contamination of experiences among farmers. IN other terms,
would it be beneficial to learn from someone else’s experience (i.e. indirect
experience)? We leave this to future research.
To the extent that increasing uptake in crop insurance markets is a main
goal for policymakers, understanding how imperfect knowledge is resolved
represents a promising area for future research. With data availability in-
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creasing more and more, understanding how farmers decide to switch among
contracts is also an important research question to help planning policy in-
terventions. Extension for this analysis should move in this direction.
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Tables
Table 1: Characteristics of the Italian insurance market
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
The size of the insurance market
Number of policies (.000) 212 211 265 208 214 206
Insured Land (.000 ha) 982 1125 1450 1153 na na
Insured Value (mln e) 3710 3789 5436 5313 6826 7951
Premia (mln e) 177 265 338 285 321 485
Indemnities (mln e) 152 149 272 169 231 316
Market shares by types of contract
Monorisk (%) 92.0 77.4 53.7 50.2 40.2 0.0
Pluririsk (%) 7.7 19.6 40.0 46.6 52.8 73.2
Multirisk (%) 0.3 2.9 6.3 3.3 6.9 26.8
Source: SicurAgro - ISMEA. Available at www.ismea.it
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Land Size (Hectares) 28.81 60.62 0.11 1072.62
Altitude (Dummy) 0.50 0.49 0 1
Farmer Age (Years) 55.45 13.63 18 89
Revenue Variability (.000 e) 31.73 124.64 0.21 292.46
Crop Diversification (Dummy) 0.78 0.41 0 1
Irrigation (Dummy) 0.27 0.44 0 1
Expected [Premium/Ha] (.000 e) 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.32
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Table 4: Role of (Transitory) Experience
Probit RE Probit Heckman
Experience 2.251∗ 2.143∗ 1.081∗
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Control factors Yes Yes Yes
Logit λ 0.44∗
[0.00]
Ln θ 0.73∗
[0.00]
λ 0.61∗
[0.00]
θ 2.07∗
[0.00]
Observations 13926 13926 18382
Log-Likelihood -2176.2 -2174.2 -2594.6
p-values in brackets. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
We control for land size, altitude, farmer age, revenue variability, crop diversi-
fication, irrigation, and expected premia per hectare. The last column reports
the APE. The estimate of λ implies that 61% of the composite error variance is
due to individual-specific effects. The parameter, estimated as a logit transfor-
mation (ln( λˆ
1−λˆ )), is computed as follows: λ =
eλˆ
1+eλˆ
. A value of θ statistically
greater than one indicates that the composite error (vit) is correlated with the
individual-specific effects.
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Table 5: Alternative Experience Measures
1 2
Transitory Experience 1.072∗
[0.00]
Permanent Experience 0.921∗
[0.00]
Land Size 0.002∗ 0.002∗
[0.00] [0.00]
Altitude -0.152+ -0.093
[0.10] [0.30]
Farmer Age -0.003 -0.007∗
[0.40] [0.03]
Revenue variability 0.531+ 0.382
[0.08] [0.19]
Crop Diversification -0.014 -0.003
[0.88] [0.98]
Irrigation 0.881∗ 0.913∗
[0.00] [0.00]
Expected [Premium/Ha] 0.912+ 0.721
[0.06] [0.12]
Observations 18382 18382
Log-Likelihood -2594.6 -2655.8
p-values in brackets. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Reported coefficients are APEs. We control for land size, altitude,farmer
age, revenue variability, crop diversification, irrigation, and expected pre-
mia per hectare. Land size is expressed in hectares, age in years, sigma
revenues is expressed in mln of euro, and expected premium per hectare
in .000 of euro. Altitude, diversification and irrigation are dummy vari-
ables.
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